The End of China's Support for a "Strong and United EU"?
Europe is lying flat, Challenges for the Transformation of EU-China Trade Cooperation, CASS Conference on EU-US-China Relations
RE-EVALUATING CHINA’S SUPPORT FOR A STRONG AND UNITED EU
Against the backdrop of the establishment of the EU-China consultative mechanism on trade, Zhou Xiaoming, a former deputy representative of China’s permanent mission to the United Nations office in Geneva and special senior fellow at the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) , wrote in The Observer on 9 July about the current status of the relationship after the Wang-Sefcovic meeting at the end of June, as well as whether China needs to reexamine its position on the EU, given Europe’s dominant characterization of China as a systemic rival.
EU backed down because its weaker than the US: Zhou discusses the reasons why the EU backed down from a potential trade war. In his view, China has proven that it will not back down when faced with US punitive tariffs, and it will react no differently when faced with EU provocations. Furthermore, the EU is more vulnerable than the US when faced with Chinese countermeasures, and its weak points are more obvious.
Two reasons why China is not interested in a trade war: He points out two reasons why China is not interested in a trade war with the EU: economically, the EU is an extremely important market for China and one of its largest sources of trade surplus; and geopolitically —
From China’s perspective, the European Union is a key factor in preventing a Third World War. … What China pursues is a multipolar world rather than a bipolar structure, and certainly not a world dominated solely by the two superpowers of China and the United States. China believes that in a multipolar world, the EU should become an important pole. If the EU truly becomes an independent and autonomous pole, rather than colluding with the United States, the probability of a Third World War breaking out would be significantly low. … Without the EU’s backing, the United States has neither the strength nor the courage to instigate a Third World War.
China supports EU unity: Zhou continues that because of these two considerations, “China has consistently viewed the European Union as a partner to unite with, and to this day, still maintains a supportive attitude toward European integration”.
Under this stance, China accommodates the EU’s sentiments as much as possible and grants it certain special considerations. For instance, in the field of rare earth export controls, China has given the green light to the EU—a level of treatment that is out of reach for the United States and Japan.
Systemic rival is the dominant view of China: Later in the text, Zhou discusses the EU’s introduction of the term “systemic rival” in its characterization of China in 2019. According to Zhou, this term has become the “dominant framework of the EU’s policy toward China.”
The designation of “systemic rival” directly pushes China to the opposite side of the EU, forcefully turning a partner into an adversary. Grounded in political confrontation, it views bilateral relations through a confrontational lens, from which numerous economic and trade disputes arise.
Attempt to weaken China: He believes that this definition of China will lead to the EU’s continuous attempts to weaken Chinese industrial competitiveness in order to maintain its own institutional advantages.
The initiation of anti-subsidy duties against China and the imposition of market access restrictions both stem from this very reason. Although the China-EU economic and trade consultation mechanisms can ease tensions to a certain extent, they cannot fundamentally resolve the underlying contradictions. The ideologization of Europe’s policy toward China will ensure that China-EU economic and trade frictions persist.
Re-examination of EU-China relations: Because of this, Zhou comes to the conclusion, that although China has supported a united EU, this “position warrants a re-examination”, and he makes no secret that he sees mainly the European Commission under President von der Leyen responsible for “obstructing” the development of relationship.
In the past, cooperation was the mainstream orientation of the EU’s policy toward China. Beijing’s support for EU unity and integration was both timely and aligned with its own interests. Today, however, dark clouds loom over Brussels, and anti-China sentiment is increasingly running high. The European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen views China as a competitor and is bent on pressuring China, effectively becoming a stumbling block to China-EU cooperation. Developing friendly relations with China is now deemed “politically incorrect.” Furthermore, the EU has obstructed bilateral exchanges between China and its member states, misinterpreting China’s efforts in bilateral relations as a “divide and conquer” strategy. The EU seems to have made up its mind on the path forward. Maintaining friendly cooperation between China and Europe now appears somewhat like wishful thinking; it is time to discard such illusions.
End of China’s Stockholm Syndrome: Therefore, the consequences of discarding wishful thinking should be an adaptation and a repositioning of China vis-a-vis the EU.
If China continues to tenaciously embrace a united and strong EU—clinging to an attitude akin to “even though you mistreat me a thousand times, I still treat you like my first love”—I am afraid that this approach is no longer appropriate for the times. As the EU’s policy toward China has changed, China’s strategy toward Europe must adjust accordingly and proactively adapt to these changes. Only by doing so can China objectively respond to the reality of the EU’s repositioning of its relationship with China.
Self-fulfilling divide-and-conquer prophecy: Although Zhou rejects EU’s divide-and-conquer misinterpretation of China’s policy towards Europe above, but he essentially suggests to do exactly that as a way forward.
Going forward, we should place greater hope on individual member states, devote more energy to working with them, and deeply cultivate bilateral relations. Naturally, we should still maintain necessary communication with EU institutions and continue to collaborate in areas where there is still room for cooperation. … The 27 EU member states have diverse interests, and their internal attitudes toward China are multi-faceted and varied.
IAA will deliver systemic shock: Zhou is under the impression that wide-spread Sinophobia in Europe clouds the judgement of politicians in the EU. He expects that despite possible adjustments to the Industrial Accelerator Act, it will nevertheless “deliver a systemic shock to China-EU economic and trade relations” once implemented.
It is foreseeable that China-EU trade frictions will persist or even escalate, and the possibility of the EU taking reckless risks cannot be ruled out. Although China has no intention of creating or expanding friction, a clash between China and Europe cannot be entirely avoided, and the economic and trade outlook is not optimistic. Therefore, we urgently need to prepare for the future, make contingency plans on both fronts, and ensure that we remain in an invincible position amidst the changing circumstances.
EUROPE IS LYING FLAT
Prominent Renmin University professor and public intellectual Jin Canrong participated in a discussion with public commentator Tang Xianglong for the website The Observer (8 June). After a segment where both discuss the current heatwave in Europe, and express disbelieve about the “mental inertia” of Europeans to adapt to these conditions, the discussion shifted towards “Europe’s development dilemma”.
Europe has fallen behind: Here, Professor Jin acknowledges Europe’s leading role in the early industrialization, but now he is convinced “Europe is indeed in trouble”, as
First, many advanced industries are no longer in Europe, and we have to face this reality. The foremost advanced industry is artificial intelligence. In this field, the United States is leading, with China closely pursuing behind. Europe has actually fallen behind and barely ranks third. … When we talk about manufacturing, we can divide it into two parts: one is advanced manufacturing, which is no longer in Europe; another part includes the artificial intelligence industry and life sciences, which are currently led by the United States and are also no longer in Europe, with China catching up as well. There are also new materials, and in new energy, China is now in the lead.
Europe no longer a teacher: Because of the shifting positions with regard to industrial development, the view of Europe has changed drastically. Jin reckons there is not much to learn from Europe anymore.
In the past, we must admit that Europe was our teacher, with various new industries first appearing in Europe and the corresponding management systems also originating there. But now, even traditional manufacturing is faltering in Europe. As a result, a situation has emerged: in technologically advanced and capital-intensive product lines, China’s export volume has surpassed its import volume, which has greatly shocked Western capital circles.
Europe is tangping-ing: While Europe, affected by rapid aging and high energy prices (“And China still imports energy from Russia, at prices that are much cheaper”), lags behind, the US and China race ahead in AI and life sciences.
In contrast, Europe seems to have somewhat laid flat (tangping, resigned or given up). In fact, both of these issues deserve serious attention from Europe: why has Europe fallen behind in the emerging industries that will shape the future of humanity? And why is it gradually losing its advantages in traditional manufacturing, where it once excelled so prominently? These are the questions that truly require deep reflection on their part.
Cause of European problems is the US: But is Europe able to solve its own set of problems which Mr Tang identifies as spanning across issues such as “politics, economy, security, and immigration”? He believes that “people like von der Leyen” are used to blaming China and are “using China as a scapegoat phrase simply because they dare not face their real problems.” Tang wrongly claims that blaming China on trade is not right because if one would include EU-US trade in services “Europe’s largest source of trade deficit is actually the United States.” Therefore, in his view,
The root cause of Europe’s problems lies first and foremost with the US, but they simply cannot confront the United States face-to-face. If people like von der Leyen were to turn around and speak to Trump in the same tone they use with China, is that even possible? They don’t have the guts.
Explaining negative feelings towards China: However, he claims, it is much easier for Europeans to have negative feelings towards China, and he explains that
This anti-China sentiment in Europe carries a very strong sense of superiority, and I believe that sense of superiority is something they truly cannot let go of. If I were European, I think I would also find it hard to come to terms with it. Over a hundred years ago, the British-French allied forces and the Eight-Nation Alliance marched into China, burning, looting, and destroying the Old Summer Palace—wasn’t that something they could do with ease? Yet now, they find themselves in a position where they have to seek China’s cooperation on so many matters. To be honest, most of Europe today faces problems in areas such as people’s livelihoods, governance, fiscal policy, and security—and not a single one of these can be resolved without consulting China.
EU is unable to solve problems: Tang then continues expressing strong skepticism that the EU is actually able to solve its own problems — again hammering Ms von der Leyen, he thinks China was rather clever ignoring her when she visited China together with President Macron, because, he believes, von der Leyen is actually rather powerless, as “the EU cannot solve its problems, and neither can its member states individually, … the EU is essentially unable to solve any real problems.”
US controls Europe via NATO: He believes that the true power steering Europe is, of course, the US, which does so via NATO.
Moreover, because of the Russia-Ukraine war, the real power in Europe lies with NATO, which is the true system determining Europe’s direction. The US directs NATO and issues its guidance through it: demanding that every country raise its defense budget to 5% of its GDP, and the countries obediently comply; the US says it will station troops here or withdraw from there, constantly stoking insecurity among European nations. Europe’s dependence on the US in security, trade, and technology has reached such a point that it simply dares not resist. Targeting China is nothing more than an excuse—just a residue of that sense of superiority left over from the days of the Eight-Nation Alliance.
CHALLENGES FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF EU-CHINA TRADE COOPERATION
In an article published (May 2026) in the Anhui Province Federation of Social Science journal Academics, Sun Yanhong, a senior researcher at Institute of European Studies at the government think tank CASS and director of the office of European Economic Studies, argues that since the establishment of official ties between the European Union (and its predecessor) and China, the economic and trade relationship has transitioned through four stages -- from steady development, rapid expansion, upgraded cooperation and increasing frictions towards geopolitical competition with rebalancing of cooperation. Throughout these periods, so Yan, the driving forces for these developments have shifted from “vertical complementarity to horizontal complementarity, from traditional bilateral complementarity to multilateral complementarity embedded in global value chains, and from production-based complementarity to innovation-driven synergistic complementarity.”
Sun believes that it is necessary to better understand these driving forces and their possible future evolution in order to to create “favorable conditions for promoting the construction of a new mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation model at the policy level”. Here, I will not go into more detail, but focus on the challenges pertaining to the transformation of these driving forces that she sees.
Geopolitical upheaval: She notices that the development of EU-China trade relations benefitted from the the process of economic globalization which was based on free trade, open markets and multilateral rules, and “it is precisely within this relatively stable and predictable international economic and trade environment that both sides have been able to continuously expand and deepen their cooperation.” But, she explains, due to the strategic rivalry between China and the US, Covid-19, and the Russia-Ukraine “conflict”, “cooperation is no longer viewed purely as a means to enhance economic efficiency, but is increasingly imbued with security, political, and even ideological connotations.” She points out that the US was critical in promoting a multilateral trading system, but
… , with changes in its domestic politics and economy and concerns over the weakening of its relative strength, the United States has in recent years gradually downplayed or even abandoned its responsibility to uphold this system, instead viewing international economic and trade relations increasingly from the perspective of zero-sum games and national security. After Trump returned to the White House in 2025, this trend has further intensified. … The US disregard for, or even abandonment of, the multilateral trading system has objectively accelerated the resurgence of the “law of the jungle” in the international economic and trade arena. In short, the international environment that once provided institutional guarantees for the continuous deepening of China-EU economic and trade cooperation in the direction of economic efficiency and mutual benefit has ceased to exist.
EU lagging behind China and its psychological maladaption: Sun writes that because Europe is lagging behind China in critical areas, it is regarding China as a “primary economic competitor”. The EU maintains a trade surplus in goods with the US, which somewhat mitigates the EU’s perception of competitive pressure from the US. However, she identifies a difference in the EU’s perception regarding its competition with the US and China.
In contrast, the EU’s competition with China is primarily concentrated in manufacturing, presenting a “head-on collision” posture; the expansion of trade imbalances between the two sides and the rise and fall of their respective global market shares have significantly amplified the European side’s competitive anxiety. Furthermore, the EU has long accepted and adapted to the status of the United States as a leading global technological and economic power; however, toward China—which was lagging behind for a long time but has achieved catch-up in several fields—it inevitably develops a stronger psychological maladaptation.
Creating negative narratives to justify de-risking: The final area that could undermine or challenge the transformation of the driving forces of EU-China development is the EU’s “comprehensive promotion of ‘de-risking’”, which has continued despite “the rift in US-EU relations”, and actually accelerated. Sun maintains that the EU tries to stay ahead technologically over China through a “European version of ‘small yard, high fence’”, i.e. export controls and outbound/inbound investment screening. And in that course, the EU …
… frequently throws out negative narratives such as so-called “overcapacity” to increase its bargaining chips for pressuring China, while on the other hand deploying a series of existing trade defense instruments and initiating new tools to step up “de-risking” toward China.
The New Normal of exploring cooperation and handling frictions: Sun believes that the relationship is entering a rebalancing phase which will create more frictions, therefore “exploring avenues for cooperation while more appropriately handling the relationship between security and competition is becoming the ‘new normal’ for China-EU economic and trade relations.”
Positive conditions: Some supportive conditions for cooperation still exists, such as the lack of “fundamental conflict of interest”, the “continuously deepened rift in US-EU relations”, and also a duality and contradiction among the EU and its member states towards economic and trade cooperation with China.
Specifically, on one side, EU institutions represented by the European Commission have adopted a tougher stance on economic and trade policy decisions toward China, significantly accelerating the pace of rolling out “de-risking” measures, and the impact and destructive power of these measures on China-EU economic and trade relations have continuously intensified. On the other side, key EU member states such as France, Germany, and Spain are striving to maintain space for pragmatic cooperation while simultaneously pursuing “de-risking” toward China, with their attitudes on certain sensitive areas even differing noticeably from the EU level. This demonstrates that the EU currently faces many practical difficulties internally when attempting to juggle multiple goals, such as balancing “de-risking” toward China, ensuring economic efficiency, and balancing the interests of member states.
Therefore, she believes that
From these complex realities, it is evident that China-EU economic and trade cooperation not only retains a foundation for development but also harbors certain potential, and its endogenous driving forces still have room to continuously convert and upgrade along established paths.
When looking at the global situation, and the “ongoing shock” against the international economic order by the “unilateralists … US government”, Sun proposes that
Both China and the EU should view their bilateral economic and trade relations from a strategic height and long-term perspective. In particular, the European side needs to examine its “de-risking” policy toward China more rationally and objectively, and view the opportunities brought by horizontal, multilateral, and innovation-coordinated complementarities conducted with the Chinese side more pragmatically, which can help Europe escape the “middle-technology trap” and enhance its competitiveness.
Possible areas of cooperation: Dr Sun suggests four areas that have potential for deepening EU-China cooperation. First, China and the EU should collaborate to maintain the WTO as the core platform of the multilateral trading system. Second, China and the EU share a consensus on tackling climate change and promoting green transition. Third, cooperation continues to advance in digital economic relations despite “pan-securitization”. Fourth, an opportunity for expanding China-EU services trade.
CASS CONFERENCE ON EU-US-CHINA RELATIONS
The Institute for European Studies at CASS published a readout on a discussion that took place on 5 July on transatlantic rifts and the implications for China-US-EU relations. The discussion was attended by participants from several high-level institutions, including Fudan University, Renmin University, Beijing Foreign Studies University, and China Foreign Affairs University.
A new arrangement of economic and trade cooperation: The director of the Institute for European Studies Feng Zhongping stated in his remarks that EU-US relations will not fundamentally breakdown, but Europe’s strategic trust in the US has declined, and issues like the Greenland crisis, US-Iran conflict have strengthened Europe’s willingness to pursue strategic autonomy. He is optimistic that despite the rising right-wing political forces, European integration will not be reversed. On EU-China relations, he states that “both sides should promote the achievement of new economic and trade cooperation arrangements, strengthen coordination in global governance reform, and jointly respond to the challenges brought about by the profound adjustment of the international order.”
A new pattern of competition and cooperation: Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies, and Director at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai pointed out that the trilateral relationship is entering a new period of adjustment, which means for US-China relations a redefinition of competition and cooperation. However, in Wu’s view, EU-China relations “are gradually shifting from traditional economic complementarity to a new pattern where competition and cooperation coexist”. He still believes that there is potential for cooperation in areas such as economic and trade cooperation and global governance, but in order to achieve “mutual beneficial” outcomes, both sides need to reduce “economic and trade friction and deepening institutional coordination”.
Cross Purposes translates and contextualizes Chinese experts’ views on EU-China relations. Opinions other than those referred to are my own and do not reflect those of any other individual or institution. Content is edited with the help of AI. Mistakes are my own.
Very interesting compilation.